Article: Anchoring and Pricing Strategy
Reviewed: November 2026 · Method version 2 · How these reviews work
Each factual claim in the article was checked against the source it cites, then challenged by reviewers whose job was to find the strongest evidence against it: replication attempts, meta-analyses, later papers that cite the original work, and research from other fields that study the same mechanism. A separate reviewer weighed both sides, and a script re-checked every quoted source. Where a claim was overstated or misattributed, the article was corrected. The research below supports the article as it now reads.
On February 1, 2012, J.C. Penney replaced most of its sales and coupons with a pricing strategy called Fair and Square: three kinds of prices, everyday, month-long and “best.”
Fair and Square kept a calendar of twelve monthly promotional events, so it cut back on discounting rather than ending it.
Sales for 2012 came in at $12.99 billion, 24.8 percent below the year before.
Part of the 2012 decline reflects the exit from catalog outlet businesses in October 2011; comparable store sales fell 25.2 percent.
Plenty changed at J.C. Penney at once, and no filing isolates one cause. Still, that phrase fits an anchoring problem. A tag reading $40, down from $60, gives the shopper a price and a number to judge it against. Remove the second number and a reasonable price has nothing to look reasonable next to.
Research on everyday-low-price strategies offers other explanations for the decline: demand responds little to lower regular prices, and customers are slow to update a store’s price image.
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman described the mechanism in 1974 as adjustment from an anchor: when a relevant number is available, people start from it and adjust, usually not far enough.
A 2026 meta-analysis of 2,601 effect sizes finds numeric anchoring large overall, even after correcting for publication bias.
The arbitrary number moved bids for every product; students with above-median numbers offered 57 to 107 percent more than those below.
A direct re-run of this manipulation (Fudenberg, Levine and Maniadis 2012) found very weak anchoring effects.
They call this coherent arbitrariness. In later experiments, where people priced unpleasant sounds they had just heard, it did not fade with experience.
The experience finding comes from Ariely and colleagues’ experiments with unpleasant sounds, which they also found robust to market interaction.
For a sales quote, negotiation studies point the same way: $4,850 tends to draw a smaller counteroffer than $5,000. With expert buyers, a figure that looks too precise can backfire unless you can show how you got it.
Precise opening offers draw smaller counteroffers from non-experts; with experts, very precise offers can backfire unless backed by a rationale (Loschelder et al. 2016, replicated with 400 real-estate agents in 2019).
In the EU, show the prior price with any announced reduction: generally the lowest price you applied in at least the 30 days before it. Member states can set different rules for perishable goods, new products and step-by-step reductions.
Article 6a(3) to (5) lets member states vary the rule for perishable goods, products on sale less than 30 days, and progressive reductions.
Whichever card comes first (left on desktop, top of the mobile stack) is the likeliest first price read. If Starter at $12 leads, Team at $30 looks steep. Lead with Business at $60 and Team is more likely to read as the sensible middle. Studies of price order find this shift when buyers expect higher tiers to be better, as plan tiers usually are. No price changed, only the scale.
The price order effect (Suk, Lee and Lichtenstein 2012) depends on buyers linking price with quality, and later work found it varies with mindset and situation.
Asking for the buyer’s budget before showing a price, which lets their number become the anchor.
First offers anchor negotiations (Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001), though the advantage disappears when the other side focuses on its own target or alternatives.
These edits were made on November 12, 2026 after the review.
Claim reviewed: On February 1, 2012, J.C. Penney replaced its constant cycle of sales and coupons with a pricing strategy called Fair and Square: three kinds of prices, everyday, month-long and “best.”
Now reads: On February 1, 2012, J.C. Penney replaced most of its sales and coupons with a pricing strategy called Fair and Square: three kinds of prices, everyday, month-long and “best.”
Why: The fiscal 2011 annual report confirms the February 1, 2012 launch and the three price types. It does not describe the old approach as a constant cycle of sales and coupons, and the new plan still kept twelve monthly promotional events, so promotions were restructured rather than replaced outright.
Claim reviewed: The ‘communicating our value proposition’ problem describes an anchoring problem: removing the former (reference) price leaves a reasonable price with nothing to look reasonable next to.
Now reads: Plenty changed at J.C. Penney at once, and no filing isolates one cause. Still, that phrase fits an anchoring problem. A tag reading $40, down from $60, gives the shopper a price and a number to judge it against. Remove the second number and a reasonable price has nothing to look reasonable next to.
Why: The article rightly says no filing isolates one cause, and reference-price research supports the idea that a visible former price raises perceived value. But other explanations fit the J.C. Penney case at least as well: shoppers respond weakly to lower everyday prices, and customers kept seeing the store as one that runs sales. The anchoring reading is plausible, not established. Now cites Compeau & Grewal, “Comparative Price Advertising: An Integrative Review,” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing (1998).
Claim reviewed: Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described the mechanism as adjustment from an anchor: when a relevant number is available, people start from it and adjust.
Now reads: Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman described the mechanism in 1974 as adjustment from an anchor: when a relevant number is available, people start from it and adjust, usually not far enough.
Why: Tversky and Kahneman do describe estimates as starting from an initial value and adjusting. The article leaves out their central point: the adjustment is usually too small, which is what makes anchoring a bias.
Claim reviewed: In Tversky and Kahneman’s best-known demonstration, estimates of how many African nations were in the United Nations tracked a number spun on a wheel of fortune, even though everyone could see it was chance.
Now reads: In their best-known demonstration, estimates of the percentage of African nations in the United Nations tracked a number spun on a wheel of fortune, even though everyone could see it was chance.
Why: The wheel-of-fortune study is Tversky and Kahneman’s own, source; the article credits it to Ariely and colleagues, who only retell it. The article’s ‘how many African nations’ follows that retelling, while the original asked for a percentage. The demonstration itself has held up in large replication projects, so only the credit and the quantity need fixing. Now cites Tversky & Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science (1974) [source 4].
Claim reviewed: The authors call this coherent arbitrariness, and found it does not fade with experience of the product.
Now reads: They call this coherent arbitrariness. In later experiments, where people priced unpleasant sounds they had just heard, it did not fade with experience.
Why: The paper does report that coherent arbitrariness does not shrink with experience, but that evidence comes from later experiments in which people priced unpleasant sounds they had just heard, not from the keyboards and wines. The wording ‘experience of the product’ points readers at the wrong experiment, and replications with consumer goods found weaker anchoring.
Claim reviewed: This is the clearest evidence that anchors move real willingness to pay; on a plan page customers can rank tiers but not price them, so the first number on the screen answers it for them.
Now reads: The best-known evidence that anchors can move willingness to pay comes from Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec. Later studies with real money found the effect smaller and less reliable than this first experiment did, though most still found it. … Now read that as a plan page. Customers can tell Pro is worth more than Starter. Whether Pro should cost $20 or $200, they can’t tell, so the first number on the screen does much of the work. Prices on a page are also real reference points rather than random digits, and anchoring on those is better established.
Why: Calling the Social Security number study ‘the clearest evidence’ overstates it. Re-runs with real money split: some found little or no anchoring from arbitrary numbers, others found lasting or large effects, and all three meta-analyses put the effect smaller than the original and weakest for random numbers when money is at stake. Anchoring on relevant prices, which is what a plan page shows, is better established, so the lesson can stay but ‘answers it for them’ is too strong. Now cites Li, Maniadis & Sedikides, “Anchoring in economics: A meta-analysis of studies on willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept,” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 90 (2021).
Claim reviewed: For a sales quote, that suggests $4,850 invites a smaller counteroffer than $5,000.
Now reads: For a sales quote, negotiation studies point the same way: $4,850 tends to draw a smaller counteroffer than $5,000. With expert buyers, a figure that looks too precise can backfire unless you can show how you got it.
Why: Janiszewski and Uy studied estimates, not counteroffers, so the sales-quote example leans on other work. Negotiation studies do find precise first offers draw smaller counteroffers, but with expert buyers too much precision backfires unless the seller explains the figure. Now cites Loschelder, Friese, Schaerer & Galinsky, “The Too-Much-Precision Effect,” Psychological Science (2016).
Claim reviewed: In the EU, any announced price reduction must show the prior price: the lowest price applied in at least the 30 days before it.
Now reads: In the EU, show the prior price with any announced reduction: generally the lowest price you applied in at least the 30 days before it. Member states can set different rules for perishable goods, new products and step-by-step reductions.
Why: The directive defines the prior price exactly this way. It also lets member states set different rules for perishable goods, products on the market less than 30 days, and step-by-step reductions, which the article’s ‘any announced reduction’ leaves out.
Claim reviewed: Whichever plan card comes first is the likeliest first price read; leading with a higher-priced plan makes the middle plan read as the sensible choice, with no price changed.
Now reads: Whichever card comes first (left on desktop, top of the mobile stack) is the likeliest first price read. If Starter at $12 leads, Team at $30 looks steep. Lead with Business at $60 and Team is more likely to read as the sensible middle. Studies of price order find this shift when buyers expect higher tiers to be better, as plan tiers usually are. No price changed, only the scale.
Why: This is uncited, but research on price presentation order supports it: options listed from the highest price down shift choices toward pricier options. That study also found the effect needs buyers to believe higher price means higher quality, which plan tiers usually satisfy, and other studies show it varies by person and situation. The article states it as a sure thing. Now cites Suk, Lee & Lichtenstein, “The Influence of Price Presentation Order on Consumer Choice,” Journal of Marketing Research (2012).
Claim reviewed: Asking for the buyer’s budget before showing a price makes their number the anchor.
Now reads: Asking for the buyer’s budget before showing a price, which lets their number become the anchor.
Why: This is uncited, but negotiation research supports it: whoever puts the first number on the table tends to get the better outcome, and first offers predict final prices. The same studies show the effect disappears when the other side focuses on its own target or alternatives, so it is a tendency, not a rule. Now cites Galinsky & Mussweiler, “First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (2001).